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# THE INTERESTS: GAME-CHANGER OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

## Abstract

This study examines the problem of interest in international relations among the selected most important participants in ongoing conflicts. The results indicated that the content of *raison d'état* is univocal for all states, but the interests significantly differentiate them in the context of time and place. The paper processed the criteria of interest classification. The analysis deals with the interests of selected powers, such as the Russian Federation, the United States, the European Union, and the People's Republic of China. At the end, the report presents conclusions with reference to the actual global situation.

## Keywords

*raison d'état*, interests, aggression, hegemony, leadership, conflict, war

## JEL Classification

F51, F52, F55, H56, O50

Life is full of unexpected situations, but there is a necessity to assess the past and current activities for understanding what is going on. Over 50 years of academic and active life within international policy tend me toward some remarks on the role of interests within international relations. Of course, these remarks are my personal responsibility, but the intention is to open a discussion on complicated security architecture.

This day is still in my memory. July 29, 1971. Geneva, Palais des Nations, European Headquarters of the United Nations. I was waiting in a queue to show security my first card confirming my right to enter Room 107. At 10.30 am, the 525th meeting of the Conference of Disarmament Committee started. Meetings are without the press, and the mass media have to wait for a briefing or a short announcement. Great, global policy behind the door. In fact, since 1966, Geneva has been the site of world diplomacy focused on topics such as disarmament, human rights, humanitarian aid, and many specialized agencies of the United Nations system. Years ago, the United Nations, as a universal organization, not only had real and great respect. In addition, we all still have been convinced that the words of the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations “We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security etc.” (UN, 1968), have been driving force in the process of building international security. It did not mean that we had no wars on Earth because at that time, the war in Vietnam with all its cruel consequences was continuing. However, the global bipolar system was more readable as East–West. My presence in Room 107 soon convinced me that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are the main actors in every field of world diplomacy. What is more, I could soon outline some main features of international relations at that time that remain valid as general principles for global activity: dynamism, rivalry, and

uncertainty. Today, I do not change my conviction, but the world has changed a lot. The contradictions are not based mainly on the balance of nuclear capability. There is no longer the threat of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as the latter no longer exists. The global security architecture is multipolar, and this is the question of the interests of different actors on the global stage. Some of them entered into the nuclear weapons club independently of signing the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or ignoring it altogether.

## 1. RAISON D'ÉTAT AND INTERESTS

Many politicians often use the term “raison d'état” when in fact they are talking about the interests. In my conviction, *raison d'état* means lasting development of the nation and its state in history. The interests varied in a context of place and time. I have noticed a significant difference during my time at the United Nations and while serving as an advisor on international affairs. What is more, contradictions of the interests in contemporary situations are not only driving forces but a real game-changer of the global security architecture. I have to say that not only now, but in the past as well. It is impossible to correctly assess the present and to mark directions of changes, trends of the future, without an acquaintance with the past. The process of cognition is continuous and, at the same time, stochastic. However, the dynamic of changes is higher because there is a multi-polar geometry of powers. Global development necessitated securing, first of all, basic needs, but in some cases, the aspiration to be the most powerful, even to play the role of a hegemon, or a more sophisticated term: leadership.

The essence of national interests results directly from the content of the above-mentioned definition of the *raison d'état*. If the *raison d'état* defines long-lasting development in history, the interests should favor the execution of that process. Of course, there is already a rich literature differentiating national interests, which facilitates an assessment of a realized state at a specific moment. So, it exactly indicates that the interests have a context of a place and time. Using this criterion, the interests can be divided into internal and external. Both groups could have a short- or long-run period of durability. The realization of those interests has a significant impact on the state system, as well as on the individual characteristics of state leaders. Looking at the current situation, it is more than enough visible.

Taking into account the criterion of time, the interests could be divided as follows:

- a) strategic (long-run), such as territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, security;
- b) operational (short-run: determined by plans or tasks with an exactly determined deadline), such as national plans, temporary agreements with neighboring countries, or international organizations.

The criterion of the place (territory) indicates the area of an activity:

- a) domestic (alleviation of poverty and hunger, primary education, health security; protection of the environment; protection of the national heritage and national identity);
- b) the neighborhood (cross-border cooperation, mutual support for security; infrastructure development);
- c) regional (economic cooperation, developing conditions for sustainable development, social cooperation);
- d) global (strategic partnerships, membership in the global international organizations, and activity to develop strong military potential).

It is obvious that every action undertaken to realize any interest could develop a reaction if the other side recognizes that there are some contradictions. So, there is another area of the relations of regional or global consequences. It means that we have to take into account different types of risk. The present situation on a global scale is the best example of how the contradictions of the interests change the security architecture and provide uncertainty for large areas of human life. Any military action in history has had different consequences, and

what is more, it has changed the international order. Not being too sophisticated, I have to say that, within the period after World War II, we already had several concepts of the New World Order, but no Global Peace. Instead of this, the world was fascinated with another word “globalization.” Many people blamed globalization for any troubles. There are indeed many opponents and vice versa, followers of those dynamic changes in the global economic, political, and security architecture. It is true that globalization has a great impact on the global economy. In the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the so-called Triad was formed, meaning three major economies made a pyramid with the USA at the top and lower Japan and the European Union. Today, this pyramid is replaced by a trapezium, with two major global economies at the top: the USA and China. Therefore, the dynamic and rivalry between those giant economies created uncertainty for others and necessitated taking into account the different kinds of risk, such as political on the micro- and macro-scales, legal, etc. For both economies (American and Chinese), the European Union is crucial. Since the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the complex relations between the USA and China in Europe are obvious. How particular interests have influenced state policy within the global security architecture will be analyzed shortly in this text.

## **2. TO BE THE LEADING POWER AGAIN: THE RUSSIAN CONTINUOUS DREAM**

Lenin said that everything that is good for the Soviet State is correct with the principles of progress and history because the socialist state in relations with the capitalistic world is always right (Heller & Niekricz, 1986). Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, it followed the imperial policy of Russia, enlarging its territory and at the same time destroying its economy. The panacea to keep people quiet within such a large country has been a paradigm of a permanent threat, which has given reasons to grow military potential and to keep its own forces outside the country. Today, the Russian Federation is a successor state to the Soviet Union, and the main task of the government is to restore

Moscow’s previous influence. Another problem of great importance for such a dream is the economy, which is still based on the export of natural resources, not on the transition of the economy into an effective system.

It is already well known from the official statement of President V.V. Putin that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This conviction legitimates any action for the restoration of that ruling over lost parts of the Soviet statehood. Former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow, Rüdiger von Fritsch, was right when he said: “Russia has no abstractive need for harmony. Russia has the interests” (Von Fritsch, 2022). The full-scale war against Ukraine was not only conducted with military action in Donbas and Crimea, but also with, as I recognize, soft and fully ingenious action to shift nuclear arms from the territory of newly established Ukraine as an independent state, to the Russian Federation. The Budapest Memorandum is only an example of how weak guarantees become when time is running out, and the guarantors have their own interests and do not intervene. Russia is an intercontinental state, and the war in Ukraine has consequences for many countries that are dependent on energy resources from Russia, such as India and China in Asia, but especially in Europe. Ukraine, as the country giving transit possibilities of gas to European countries, plays a geostrategic role not only for exporters but importers as well. That is why for Russia it is of crucial interest to include this country into the Russian Federation or to have a pro-Russian government. The second one is to stop the processes of possible membership of Ukraine within the European Union; it is very hard to say in what perspective it could be realized. More prospective projects are important to pass by not only Ukraine, which is a party, but also Nord-Stream I and Nord-Stream II, which were constructed together with some influential members of the European Union. Russian lobbying was in detail described by Jens Høvsgaard (his book made an analysis of how secret services have been involved in the process of negotiations and how top politicians profited from an agreement to give green light to start that project) (Høvsgaard, 2017). It is just an example of how the interests are a game-changer for one of the most important parts of national economies, like energy. The aggression

on Ukraine stopped the project as one of the side effects of this conflict. However, there is no unanimous approach to stop relations with Russia.

Another unexpected by the Russian administration attitude to the NATO membership was intention to ask for membership in that pact by Sweden and Finland. Such argumentation, that the possible membership of Ukraine in the NATO pact is closer to the borders of Russia at the moment, should be revised together with the idea of zones of influence, as it was in the past between East and West. Today, it is clear that bipolar architecture has been replaced by multipolar architecture. However, Russian policy after the retreat of military troops from the former German Democratic Republic and Poland has been described as “an especially important zone of interests, that should be dependent on whether it will be needed with all tools, including military” (Niezawisimaja Gazieta, 1996). For Russian foreign policy, multilateralism means multidirectional to be more pragmatic and not to follow western fraseology.

The recent conflict between the USA and Iran has important consequences for Russian politics. First, after American and Israeli strikes on the production center of weapons such as drones, which Iran exports to Russia to use them in the strikes on Ukraine, maybe it will be necessary to look for another supplier. More importantly, Russia declared support for Iran in case of a conflict. At the moment, it is only verbal, because in reality, Russia has no ability to send military forces to the Middle East. The loss of military bases in Syria weakened the mobility in the air and on the Mediterranean Sea.

Another strategic question is the position of China, which has its own interests and is waiting for further development, encouraging all sides of a conflict to sit down and start negotiations. Russia is dependent on its gas and oil exports to China and must take care of that partner, delivering financial support to the budget, taking into account different sanctions. However, in fact, it has had little impact on the economic security of Russia. In my opinion, more negative consequences for Russian interests will result from any involvement in Asia.

The Russian arms trade has recently had some troubles in Asia. India, the most important importer of Russian weapons, changed its direction

to modernize its air forces, not with Russian airplanes. However, the French Rafale, with an impressive deal, gives France a significant presence in that market. What is more, India has taken advantage of sanctions to import oil from Russia at lower prices and, after the refining process, resells it to Europe. President Trump decided to allow a temporary Indian import of oil from Russia to maintain the last positive results of talks with India, and further the presence of American military forces on Diego Garcia Island. This situation leads to the necessity to redefine the policy of Russia within the Asian continent. The relations with China are described separately.

### 3. THE UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND CLASH OF INTERESTS

The attack of the United States on Iran draws our attention to the words of Henry Kissinger, “The country that in the 20th century influenced international relations in a significant and at the same time non-univocal manner was the United States” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 17). American foreign policy underwent an essential transformation since 1823, when President Monroe launched his doctrine, setting up the interests of the United States as dominance on the entire American continent and the elimination of the European colonial empires. This primary isolationism was replaced by the will of domination and hegemony after both World Wars. Nowadays, the Commission on America’s National Interests suggests that only a sound foundation for a sustainable American foreign policy is a clear sense of America’s national interests (Allison & Blackwill, 2000). After the Yalta Agreements, it was already clear that the Soviet Union wanted to play a superpower role. However, the former Adviser for National Security to President Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, explained that after the collapse of the Soviet state, “the United States did not intend to share the power in the world with the post-Soviet Russia” (Brzezinski, 1997). During the still ongoing war in Ukraine, Robert Kagan argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union only enhanced U.S. global hegemony “and the invasion of Ukraine is taking place in a historical and geopolitical context in which

the United States has played and still plays the principal role, and Americans must grapple with this fact” (Kagan, 2022).

Stephen M. Walt (in his newest essay) described the United States under President Donald Trump as the predatory hegemon: “a dominant great power that views all bilateral relations as inherently zero-sum and seeks to extract the greatest possible benefits from each one” (Walt, 2026). Even today, being confronted with the war in the Middle East, we have to recognize the United States as a global power with full consciousness about the consequences of that conflict on a global scale. At the same time, the USA is engaged in Ukraine, looking for the reaction of the second global power, China. The war with Iran is the war with an important partner of the People’s Republic of China and Russia. It is the problem of the magnitude and interconnectedness of Chinese and European countries with the Gulf countries. The combined strike on Iran, together with Israel, only shows how strong and resilient the relations between the United States and Israel are. For such interconnection, some authors have given attention; “U.S. hegemony remains unchallenged. The United States consistently demonstrates steadfast support for Israel, revealing that its primary objective is not merely fostering peace and security in the Middle East but empowering Israel to act as a counterbalance to Arab powers in the region” (Abumbe et al., 2024). Israel is indeed living in a permanent state of readiness for its security, but its war will have more than regional consequences. Possibly, it will build resistance against the President in the United States Congress, supported by public opinion. It will affect the Transatlantic Alliance. It is already a hard time for Trump to stop the European Union leaders from destroying NATO and unity against Russia in Ukraine. It is not a simple equilibrium anymore because the ambitions and interests of Germany and France are more than expected. Henry Kissinger years ago warned that “mutual interest of America and Europe is do not allow the situation when the nationalistic politics of Germany competes in the heart of the continent with politics of Russia on the same character and too far going rapprochement of Germany with Russia is a threat of building condominium, and involvement into new controversies” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 904). It is already

very clear that the European Commission is on the way to being more governed by leaders from Germany, representing Germany’s interests and, to some extent, France’s. It is not in the interest of the United States and the whole NATO that a new political system be established in Europe, as the federal system proposed by Germany and supported by France. There are already steps out of the treaties that give more pace for the power of the European Union against sovereignty, as for instance in the sphere of law, education, security (the last concept of SAFE), and pressure for non-Euro countries to introduce the Euro as national currency. Another problem is dependence on gas, and the war in the Middle East favors Russia as the main supplier of those energy resources.

#### 4. THE EUROPEAN UNION AT THE CROSSROADS

The United States engagement in assisting the military forces of Ukraine has been very valuable. On the other side, in Germany, it was delayed because there is an interest in being the main force within the European Union, and that is why it was a very calculated attitude and approach. The German point of view on the war in Ukraine is not the same as that of the United States, and it was clear from the beginning of the war. Germany is interested in opening the Nord Stream II pipeline. The problem is that the difficulties are not the actions of several countries, Member States of the European Union, but the aggression by Russia against Ukraine. It is the main problem. However, it shows the real goals of the enterprises exploiting this pipeline. Full exploitation of that pipeline shows how Russia does business against Ukraine and other Baltic countries for the so-called whole post-Soviet Europe. The interruption of the gas supply to Ukraine and Poland through the pipelines shows the essence of this infrastructure. Russian gas-monopoly was warned already before the Nord Stream I entered into force by Alexej Chajtun from European Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences (in an interview): “for the Kremlin, it is less important the economic purposes as political power” (Focus, 2008). From time to time, the words about difficulties for the European economy are linked with the war in Ukraine and problems with the lack of Russian gas. That is why, as the people hear

from politicians, we have problems with effectiveness and peaceful relations, because what is most wanted is business as usual with Russia. The clash of interests within the European Union is not a problem of recent years. Within the European community, until the catastrophe of September 11, 2001, in New York, we had no Security Strategy. Something unbelievable: Europe at that time had full conviction that the security of European integration is based on the power of the Transatlantic Alliance with NATO (so mostly American power). The European Union never realized that its strategies always justified this collapse with mostly external factors and some new ones, for example, because we had an enormous enlargement in 2004, and then the problems with preparations for the new treaty, which, after adoption, not without troubles, in Lisbon is known as the Lisbon Treaty. The previous Lisbon Strategy for the decade from 2000 to 2010 was replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy. What a happy factor for the European Commission to say that the COVID-19 pandemic changed our goals to focus on providing safe conditions for survival.

In 2015, on the initiative of the presidents of Poland and Croatia, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) was launched, which was a surprise for the European Commission, especially Germany. Later in 2016, the meeting was organized in Dubrovnik (Croatia), and 12 presidents formally joined the Initiative. The interests of the Central European countries do not always depend on the European Commission's decisions, as was clearly expressed. Following the idea, the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Polish Bank) established the Three Seas Fund. The United States House of Representatives passed a unanimous resolution supporting the Three Seas Initiative, and the American administration provided 300 million USD in support of the Fund. The Member States of the Initiative fully condemned, immediately after the aggression on Ukraine, the Russian Federation. Following its support for Ukraine's accession into the European Union, the country supports military efforts to defend the country. It is obvious that the longer the war continues, the more changes in reaction to ending the war and what the final effect will be. In the European Union, after blocking the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine, Hungary, and Slovakia, there is

opposition to financing from the EU to Ukraine's military efforts. At the same time, in the United States, there are some changes to the proposals on how to end the war in Ukraine. If at the beginning of the so-called "special military operation" the point of view presented by many serious personalities was based on the principle of the restoration of all Ukrainian-occupied territory (including Crimea), in a word, territorial integrity must be the foundation to establish peaceful relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Lately, President Trump proposed some steps back and to leave some occupied territory to Russia. As a consequence of such a new point of view, some American authors (Slezkine & Shiffrinson, 2026) present to the public opinions that may be the price of peace and to engage the United States and NATO, where there are already different attitudes linked with dreams for business as usual with the Russian Federation. There are voices that Ukraine is losing the war, so there is no reason to maintain conflict instead of peace (Desch, 2026). It is very easy to advise losing the territory when it is occupied by the aggressor. I do not accept the Second Yalta Agreement, which was made without the involvement of the countries concerned, to establish new borders. But happily, we adopted the principle and solemn obligation that the next (after World War II) change of borders will be only with peaceful agreements, not with military conflicts. Accepting such an approach in negotiations will give the feeling that when we are strong enough, we can do what we want. The confidence in international law institutions will be destroyed. However, it is nothing new, as over the last 80 years in the world, a lot of violence has been done. When the war ends, Russia will definitely be closer to the West, as it is already closer to NATO Member States after Finland and Sweden accede to the Pact.

The real contradiction of interests and the uncertain future of European agriculture is dealing with the last agreement with Mercosur. Why do I draw attention to that issue? Just because it will affect the European Agricultural Common Policy and, as a consequence, will provide hard competition with Latin American imports of meat, first of all, but also cereals. After the first month of the aggression against Ukraine, European Union countries urgently had to respond to the import of

cheaper Ukrainian grains, which caused trouble for local farmers in Poland, mainly due to high pressure on the European Commission to regulate the matter. If Ukraine is accepted as a full Member of the European Union, it should be prepared for the hard competition with the Mercosur import. It would be rather a battle between large agricultural companies than among small farmers, as in the rest of Europe. The consequence: a large collapse of small farmers and annihilation of the Common Agricultural Policy and principles of the Common Trade Policy in the section dealing with Fragile Products such as agricultural goods. It would be the price for a large interest in, first of all, industrial export from the Western European Member States to Latin America.

## 5. CHINA – PRAGMATISM, PATIENCE, AND IDENTITY

I still have this moment in my memory when the delegation from Beijing replaced the diplomats from Taiwan under the table and began its duties at the United Nations. Just 55 years ago, the People's Republic of China changed the climate of discussion not only at the General Assembly but across the entire United Nations System. The world, with great attention, heard the explanation of the opinion and had to take into account Chinese interests as well.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his Statement at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, emphasized Chinese strategic policy, saying: "China will always remain a builder of world peace, and stay committed to the path of peaceful development. No matter how the international landscape may evolve or how our country may develop, China will never seek hegemony, never engage in expansionism, and never try to build its own sphere of influence" (Xi, 2022).

Assessing the character of Chinese foreign policy, I can only use the word "pragmatism." Such pragmatism is grounded (in my conviction and knowledge of China) on three fundamental principles:

a) continuity (which is emphasized in many speeches of the President Xi Jinping, as for in-

stance in his speech at the College of Europe in Brugge, Belgium, in April 1, 2014: "First, China is a country of the world's ancient civilizations, China has continued unbroken to this day and has a history of over 5000 years" (Xi, 2022, p.146));

b) national identity (keyword used within the country and officially in political statements abroad);

c) integrity (it is emphasized by Chinese policy).

Those fundamental principles are decisive for national interests, and their realization is marked by pragmatism. This basic feature of Chinese policy is characterized by high efficiency in pursuing aspirational aims. There is no doubt that Chinese policy and interests are global. It is sufficient to have a look at the launched (already five) initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative sparked a large discussion about the mechanism and scope of this project. Soon it was clear that its range and capacity are global. The four others are the Global Development Initiative (presented in 2021), the Global Security Initiative (launched in 2022), the Global Civilization Initiative (launched in 2023), and the Global Governance Initiative (launched in 2025). Such diplomatic activity is mainly focused on "the Global South," positioning China as the leader and promoter of developing countries and their interests. In the opinion of the Chinese experts, "China Initiatives comprehensively promote quality and efficiency of international public goods, being an enabling platform for unity and cooperation of the Global South" (Chun, 2023). Such an approach can be seen as an abandonment of the old concept of the past, such as "The World's Town and the World's Country," in favor of a more progressive, innovative, and pragmatic one. Looking at Western promises, these initiatives favor China's policy and build strong economic and political ties between many developing countries and the People's Republic of China.

What about the European Union? The approach to the relations with China is strongly diversified. On the level of the European Commission, the relations are to some extent rather correct, but should be better, as China is an important trade

partner for Europe. Chinese economic power is underestimated by the majority of politicians and administrations. Europe is leaning first of all on Russia, but Russia is dependent on China in many areas. If we realize how the United States is working with China, then in Europe, there should be an alarm. China has a negative attitude toward so-called “wild emigration,” similar to President Trump; another negative approach is the “federalization” of Europe, which is forecast to create future tensions on the continent and could jeopardize Chinese interests in the larger context. Over the years, the European Commission and its leaders have lived in a conviction and presented this dream as reality about the European Union as a global player, and now the global player is China. For many, it is already a bad dream. China is investing more in the R&D sector than the United States and the European Union combined. In the Academic Ranking of World Universities, 13 Chinese universities are ranked among the top 100 worldwide. The long years of a conviction that European big enterprises can use Chinese cheaper labor forces as they did during the association period of the 10 Central European countries before their full Membership (since May 1, 2004) are finished. China has ambitious goals, and in the interest of this country is to live in a peaceful environment. China is not excluding European countries from its interests, which is why it signed the Strategic Partnership Agreements with selected countries (mainly with Central European) with possible support for the idea of the Three Seas Initiative, but closely with Hungary and Serbia.

In China, special attention is given to BRICS and its development and enlargement. As Chinese experts emphasized “the priority of BRICS expansion should be given to major developing countries of systematic importance” (Renwei & Jiejun, 2022). The war of the United States with Iran is, in fact, the war with a member state of BRICS. Iran can expect support from other members of this group, especially Russia, China, or India. The last events just show us that it is not only hope but reality. The United States has an urgent need to stabilize the conflict; otherwise, the cost of war will be very high, not only economically but also politically, both in the World and within the country. For China, it is also in its best interest to end the war, as it complicates the realization of the Belt and Road Initiative and the growing position of India in the Indo-Pacific region. This conflict between the USA and Iran has some side effects, as some NATO members are distancing themselves from this conflict, taking into account the global context of this American attack, similar to the aggression of Russia in Ukraine. There is no doubt that China will gain some profits; for instance, in the event of difficulties with oil and gas supplies from the Gulf States, it will simply openly buy energy resources from Russia. India will do the same. So international restrictions on Russia will be stopped, and possibly, by some European countries, the same process will be applied, which will do harm to Ukraine. It depends a lot on China’s position on how to solve this conflict, which makes a lot of disturbances in relations with the United States, as the main competitor of China.

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## CONCLUSION

The past should not be ignored when assessing the present structure of the world’s powers. Developed over decades, paradigms still indicate that they are functioning.

The interests of the organizations or states, structure, and even individual leaders are a real game-changer with both negative and positive impacts on global security geometry.

Discussions on the legal background of the American attack on Iran undermine the credibility of those who did not oppose when Russia started aggression against Ukraine.

In case of a transformation of conflict between the United States and Iran into a regular war, the winners will be Iran, Russia, and China, and to some extent, the Western Member States of the European Union.

The Arab world will probably stay more consolidated against Israel.

It seems to be very difficult for Ukraine to obtain the status of a full Member State of the European Union. At the moment, it is too optimistic.

The regional conflicts with participation of the permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council generally raise a question on the real importance and effectiveness of that organization.

Maybe my remarks are going too far, but assessing the past and present situation for many strong Poland and strong Ukraine is not in the interest expected at all. It would be interesting to see how the Three Seas Initiative, with Ukraine in it, will transform the European Union's biggest economies' interests.

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